Houthis Resume Saudi Attacks, Threatening Red Sea Oil Route

What changed

Yemen’s Houthi rebels resumed attacks on Saudi Arabia in July, declared a blockade on Saudi shipping and fired on several Saudi oil tankers, threatening Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea export route as Iran’s disruption of the Strait of Hormuz has already raised fuel and goods prices. Saudi Arabia has used pipelines across the Arabian Peninsula to move oil to the Red Sea and avoid Hormuz. The Bab el-Mandeb and Red Sea corridor carries 12% of global trade in peacetime, according to AP News.

The July attacks ended the practical hold of a 2022 truce between the Houthis and Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Saudi Arabia has vowed to respond but appears keen to avoid a return to full-scale war, AP reported.

Why it matters

Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea route is now both an alternative to Hormuz and a target. The Houthis’ declared blockade and tanker attacks put that bypass at risk, though the scale and duration of any interruption have not been established.

The Houthis previously targeted more than 100 merchant ships between November 2023 and December 2024, sinking two and killing four sailors; that campaign sharply reduced Red Sea trade flows, according to AP News.

The historical parallel

The closest precedent is the September 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco’s Abqaiq processing facility and Khurais oil field. Brent and WTI rose $9 and $8 per barrel, respectively, on the next trading day, but returned to pre-attack levels by the end of September as Saudi production recovered within weeks and increased U.S. output cushioned supply, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

That episode involved damaged fixed facilities; the current threat is to tanker movements and shipping access. Unlike 2019, the reported Red Sea threat coincides with disruption at Hormuz, limiting the value of alternative routes and supply buffers.

How the effects could spread

Attacks or effective blockade enforcement could delay or deter Saudi tankers using the Red Sea. If Hormuz remains disrupted at the same time, Saudi exporters would have less routing flexibility, carriers could reduce Red Sea transits or divert ships, and constrained seaborne energy transport could add to fuel and goods-cost pressure.

The chain could be interrupted if Saudi tanker traffic continues without sustained disruption, inventories and alternative supply absorb delays, or attacks subside.

Impact assessment

| Stakeholder | Likely effect | Horizon | |---|---|---| | Saudi oil exporters | The Red Sea bypass is directly exposed to tanker attacks and blockade threats. | Immediate | | Commercial carriers | Renewed risk may lead to route changes or fewer Red Sea transits. | Days | | Fuel and goods importers | Higher transport costs could feed into delivered prices if both Red Sea and Hormuz routes are constrained. | Weeks |

Scenarios

Our outlook (informed speculation):

Most likely: If Saudi Arabia keeps its response limited and attacks disrupt operations without halting Red Sea tanker traffic, exporters and carriers will continue using available routes while assigning more operational value to Red Sea security. Freight and fuel-cost pressure would remain elevated over coming weeks to 6–12 months, without a return to full-scale Saudi-Houthi war. Continued tanker movements and restrained Saudi military action would support this path.

Upside: If attacks subside or fail to impede tanker operations, Saudi oil movements through the Red Sea will remain a workable bypass around Hormuz. Inventories, alternative supply and rerouting could absorb the disruption, easing additional transport pressure on fuel and goods costs within weeks. No sustained reduction in Saudi Red Sea oil flows would support this outcome.

Downside: If repeated attacks or blockade enforcement materially deter tankers while Hormuz remains effectively closed, Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea bypass capacity could shrink. Carriers may avoid the corridor, tightening seaborne energy transport and increasing pressure on delivered fuel and goods costs over weeks to 6–12 months. Sustained diversions, delays or reduced Saudi tanker traffic would point toward this outcome.

What to watch next

• Whether Saudi oil tankers continue transiting the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb.
• Whether Houthi attacks repeatedly delay or divert commercial shipping.
• Whether Saudi Arabia’s response remains limited or expands toward broader war.
• Whether disruption at the Strait of Hormuz persists or eases.